Internal Displacement in Ukraine: Where the Government Went Wrong by Albert, Annelise
1 
 
Internal Displacement in Ukraine:  
Where the Government Went Wrong. 
 
 
 
 
 
By Annelise Albert 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion 
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the  
Croft Institute for International Studies 
The University of Mississippi 
 
 
 
 
 
       Approved: 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Advisor: Dr. Joshua First 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
Reader: Dr. Shine Choi 
2 
 
Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this project was to show how the Ukrainian government has 
delegitimized itself currently in the eyes of the Ukrainian People through its handling of 
the internal displacement problem. To show this, this thesis analyzes Ukrainian 
legislation passed pertaining to internally displaced people and how these pieces of 
legislation have been ineffective at producing any significant change in the IDP problem. 
In certain cases, this legislation is correlated with an increase in the number of IDPs. 
Further, this thesis analyzes the decline in public opinion of Ukrainian citizens with the 
government. Through interviews of different human rights organizations and displaced 
people, evidence is provided for this decline. Due to the contemporary nature of this 
topic, it would be preemptive to make any final conclusions at this point in time. Rather, 
this thesis is intended to give an update on present events and provide possible solutions 
to a current problem. 
  
3 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………….….3 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction.…..………………………………………………………………………..4 
 
 
 
2. How the Ukrainian Government Contributed to the IDP Problem…………...………...8 
 
 
 
3.  Decline in Public Support Further Undermines the Legitimacy of the 
Government.......……………………………………………………………………….…25 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion...………………………………………………………………………..…35 
 
 
 
Works Cited….…………………………………………………………………………. 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 First, I would like to thank my mentor Dr. Joshua First for his help and support 
throughout this entire process.  His knowledge of Ukraine and Ukrainian culture helped 
me discover this topic, and his advice constantly pushed me to dig deeper in my research.  
I would also like to thank Dr. Kees Gispen and Dr. Shine Choi, my second and third 
readers, for taking time to read and provide valuable comments on my work. Both of 
your comments helped me to further my project and were greatly appreciated.  
 
 Second, I would like to thank my family and friends for their continual support.  
Thank you for listening and empathizing with me during this journey. Your advice means 
more than you know.  Specifically, I would like to sister Mary Linley Albert for reading 
and editing multiple drafts, while also encouraging me when I did not want to continue.  I 
would also like to thank Lidia McGuire and Kathryn Johnston for their reassurance 
throughout this process, and for buying me multiple Dr. Peppers on stressful days. Both 
of you are two of the best friends and emotional support system someone could ask for. 
Finally, I would like to thank my amazing fiancé Daniel Blount for listening to me 
complain, constantly listening to me explain my arguments, and never ceasing to support 
me even when I did not necessarily deserve it. This process has been difficult yet 
rewarding, and I thank everyone for their support.   
 
 Thank you again to all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The Ukrainian government has long been plagued with corruption and political 
turmoil, and in 2014, this turmoil allowed Russia to invade Crimea and the Eastern 
regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. Due to these invasions and later annexations, the 
Ukrainian government has faced the task of dealing with an influx of displaced people 
from Crimea and the Eastern regions. These internally displaced people create hardships 
for an already strained government by adding pressure for social and economic 
provisions. The Ukrainian government’s mishandling of the IDP problem is causing it to 
suffer a loss of legitimacy that is framing the government to be perceived by citizens as 
inept and weak. The government of Ukraine believes that it is successfully handling the 
IDP crisis. However, this is not correct. In this thesis, I will argue that the Ukrainian 
government has not only failed in positively handling the IDP crisis but has also possibly 
added further strain to the situation. This failure has metastasized in the minds of citizens 
as a government that can render no help to its people, leading the citizens of Ukraine to 
look to international humanitarian organizations for help. 
The origins of the Ukrainian IDP crisis can be traced back to the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in March of 2014.  In late February, unidentified Russian troops 
invaded Crimea and took over airports and other strategic buildings.  The Russian 
authorities argued this was not unlawful because it did not go against the Partition Treaty 
of 1997.  This treaty, renewed by Ukrainian President Yanukovych in 2010 as part of the 
Kharkov Pact, allowed Russia to maintain no more than 25,000 troops on the Crimean 
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Mainland.  After invasion, a referendum for reunification with Ukraine or Russia was 
presented on March 16, 2014.  According to the commission of the referendum, 82% of 
Crimea’s population voted in favor of reunification with Russia, and on March 18, 
Crimea officially became part of the Russian Federation (Sakwa 2014, 104). It is 
important to note the illegality of this referendum and to question its validity. According 
to Article 72 of the Ukrainian Constitution, only the Verkhovna Rada, the legislative 
branch of Ukrainian government, or the president can call for a referendum. Furthermore, 
Article 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution states that only “nationwide referendums can 
solve the question of alterations to Ukrainian territory.” Therefore, the Crimean 
referendum is in violation of the Ukrainian Constitution because the president or 
Verkhovna Rada did not issue it, nor were all citizens of Ukraine granted the right to 
participate in the voting process. In addition, there is question of whether the citizens 
were forced to vote for reunification with Russia due to pressure from the presence of 
Russian soldiers at the voting polls, making the vote neither free nor fair (Brilmayer 
2014). Even though the referendum is illegal and the percentage of Crimeans voting in 
favor of reunification with Russia is widely disputed, these actions still resulted in the 
annexation of Crimea. This annexation led to an exodus of people from Crimea to 
mainland Ukraine.  
After Crimea became part of the Russian Federation, Crimean Tatars experienced 
immediate persecution, with Crimean party leaders denied reentry to the peninsula and 
the banning of several Crimean Tatar organizations (Yekelchyk 2015, 132).  In an 
interview, a Crimean Tatar who fled from Yalta to Kiev stated he felt that Crimea “has 
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turned into a prison” and referred to different cases where people of Muslim faith have 
mysteriously disappeared (NATO Review 2015). These disappearances, fear of further 
Russian persecution, and bans on Ukrainian and Tatar language resulted in several people 
fleeing the peninsula.  According to Humanitarian Reports, a month after annexation 
2,954 people fled the Crimean Peninsula for mainland Ukraine. By September of 2014 
this number increased to 17,928 people displaced. 
After the invasion of Crimea, anti-government separatists in the south-east regions 
of Ukraine backed by Moscow capitalized on the unstable government and voiced their 
disapproval by means of protests and seizure of government property (Grytsenko 2014). 
The separatists placed Russian flags on Donetsk’s central square in early March of 2014 
and demanded that local deputies declare the post-Maidan Kiev government illegitimate 
and put local security forces under regional control (Salem 2014). Only one month later 
on April 7, these desires for regional autonomy morphed into the declaration of Donetsk 
as an independent republic, formally known as the Donetsk People’s Republic. The 
Lugansk region declared independence shortly after on April 27 and is now known as the 
Lugansk People’s Republic.  The creation of these two republics resulted in a conflict 
between Russian backed separatists and Ukrainian military forces. These early military 
encounters resulted in the initial displacement of 10,201 people who lost their homes and 
livelihoods due to the constant bombing and shelling tactics employed by the opposing 
forces (United Nations Children Emergency Fund 2014, 2.) Other citizens of these 
regions took preemptive measures and fled to parts of Ukraine where there were no active 
conflicts. The UNHCR sites that as of July 29, 2014, the total number of displaced 
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citizens in Ukraine increased to 111,616. They further state that by August of 2014, this 
number had risen to 190,087 internally displaced Ukrainian citizens (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 2014, 6). On April 25, 2016, the Ministry of Social 
Policy announced there were 1,780,245 people considered displaced within Ukraine 
(Ukraine Today 2016). 
The term internal displacement is employed concerning peoples who are forced to 
flee from their place of residence but do not cross an international border. Internal 
displacement is not a problem specific only to Ukraine; it is experienced in countries 
worldwide. In order to combat increases in internal displacement, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees included displaced people in their 1972 mandate. In 
1998, a representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons presented 
the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. These principles became an important part of the framework on internal 
displacement for emergency relief coordinators, human rights organizations, and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  
 The Guiding Principles were established to provide clarification on the rights of 
internally displaced people (IDPs.)  Prior to these guidelines, the only laws existing 
regarding the rights of IDPs were ambiguous human rights laws. The Guiding Principles 
define who is considered displaced, the parties responsible for the protection of IDPs, and 
details the requirements of that responsibility. According to these principles, the national 
government and local authorities are responsible for the protection of IDPs.  However, in 
a foreword to the principles, the importance of the involvement of the international 
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community is stressed in enhancing protection of IDPs (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 2004, 3). In theory, the Guiding Principles appear to be the form of 
action needed to help IDP crises worldwide. However, because the document is non-
binding, there are many problems enforcing the principles (Georgetown University 
2007). 
 The Guiding Principles are based on existing international humanitarian law, but 
they are only equal to the ratification of human rights in a particular state. Therefore, the 
Guiding Principles are used as a suggested standard to follow, but each nation decides to 
what extent to abide by them. The UNHCR can make suggestions based on the principles 
to the governments of countries dealing with the issue of internal displacement, but this 
does not mean they will be accepted. This contributes heavily to the current period of 
internal displacement in Ukraine. The UNHCR has offered suggestions to the Ukrainian 
government, but these suggestions have been ignored or subjected to long 
parliamentarian delays. Therefore, the Ukrainian government has provided little help to 
its displaced citizens and has possibly intensified the strain placed on IDPs. 
 In order to be successful in dealing with the IDP crisis, there are two paths the 
Ukrainian government must travel.  First, the Ukrainian government needs to enforce its 
existing legislation concerning IDPs. As explored later in this thesis, the Ukrainian 
Government attempted to put forth legislation listing the rights and social benefits 
displaced people would receive; however, the legislation was weak and was not carried 
out. The government did not provide a system of checks and balances for the regional 
centers placed in charge of handling the problems IDPs experienced. As a result, these 
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regional centers were able to pass on the responsibility of dealing with IDPs to 
humanitarian organizations. Second, the government needs to rebuild infrastructure in 
areas retaken under government control. Recently, IDPs began returning to their homes 
but found them damaged or completely destroyed. The government has attempted to aid 
the situation by restoring electricity and water in these recently acquired areas (European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protections Department 2016, 5.). While this 
is a positive action taken by the government, the people need more than just standard 
utilities. To achieve success, the government should concern itself with implementing 
programs to rebuild homes, workplaces, and government buildings, while also listening 
to the needs of the people. These actions, if taken by the government would not only 
greatly aid the IDP crisis, they would also lend the Ukrainian government the sense of 
legitimacy it needs to improve its image in the eyes of the people.  
 As of now, the Ukrainian government has failed to successfully implement 
programs to aid displaced people within Ukraine. This thesis will highlight the 
government attempts at aid first, by analyzing different pieces of legislation put forth by 
the government in terms of IDPs. By reviewing legislation, it is clear where the 
government has fallen short on the IDP problem, and where it could improve its 
strategies for handling displaced people. After analyzing legislation, this thesis will 
explore how the government has lost a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and 
what the Ukrainian people actually think of their government. This is evident in 
interviews of displaced people and the humanitarian workers who are helping them. 
Through these interviews, the reliance on humanitarian organizations is evident. 
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Displaced people are more reliant on the organizations for help rather than the 
government, and view the government attempts at aid as failure. This failure has led the 
Ukrainian government to lose legitimacy in the eyes of Ukrainian people at a time when a 
sense of legitimacy is needed to unite Ukraine.   
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Chapter Two: How the Ukrainian Government Contributed to the IDP Problem 
 
Prior to 2014, Ukraine had never experienced internal displacement; therefore, the 
government lacked the necessary tools to adequately handle the problem. To understand 
how the government has only further harmed internally displaced people, it is important 
to examine its original attempts to solve the problem. So far, the legislation put forth has 
been half-hearted because of a preoccupation with resolving the conflict in the East. 
Thus, the problem of internal displacement is not at the forefront of the government 
agenda, and the percentage of displaced citizens has only increased.  The failure to 
acknowledge the severity of the problem and the importance of rectifying it has led to an 
immense lack of faith in the government. Further, it has undermined the legitimacy of the 
Ukrainian authorities to be able to provide for its citizens.  
As stated, the Ukrainian government was ill prepared to deal with such large 
quantities of people moving within the country’s borders due to its focus on tackling 
corruption and overcoming economic instability. This preoccupation is seen after the 
election of President Poroshenko when he signed particular parts of the Association 
Agreement with the European Union in June of 2014.  This was an attempt by the 
government to secure a market for Ukrainian exports and stabilize the country (Pifer 
2014). However, at this time already 54,405 people were already displaced in Ukraine 
with no official law guaranteeing their rights or creating programs for social and 
economic support (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014, 1). Further, 
two days before Poroshenko signed the economic portion of the Association Agreement, 
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the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic combined as the 
Union of Peoples’ Republics and once again publicly declared support for Russia 
(Yekelchyk 2015, 145).  The ongoing armed conflict between the central Ukrainian 
government and the officials of the Eastern region contributes heavily to the rise of IDPs 
in the country.   
This chapter will explore different legislation put forth by the Ukrainian 
government concerning displaced people from Crimea and the eastern regions of Donetsk 
and Lugansk. Through analyzing the government’s early attempts to control the situation, 
its unwillingness to recognize the severity of the IDP problem will be revealed. Further, 
this chapter will look at later attempts by the government to create new legislation after 
its original effort provided no relief. The end of the chapter then looks at recent attempts 
by the government to change laws concerning displaced people, making them easier to 
understand and more fitting to their needs. By looking at the different stages of 
legislation, one can see how the Ukrainian government handled the IDP problem, where 
it fell short, and where it contributed to an increase in displaced peoples, further 
undermining the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.  
 
Early Attempts to Amend the Crisis 
In April of 2014, 2,954 people were already registered as displaced within 
mainland Ukraine (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund Ukraine 2014, 1). In 
response to this, the Cabinet of Ministers issued Resolution 298-p on April 7, 2014. This 
resolution placed the responsibility of establishing a headquarters to administer housing 
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and food to displaced people on regional and city officials. It also detailed that 
information would be updated daily in these headquarters on available places to reside. 
The resolution further stated the needs of the ministries and agencies to “ensure through 
the media, social networking, and by distributing leaflets and other information materials 
to citizens of Ukraine who are moving of their own rights and obligations.”   
Problems with this resolution appeared immediately. The regional authorities 
charged with giving assistance to IDPs did little to help and often shifted the 
responsibility to volunteer groups and civil organizations (Williamson 2014, 3).  
Although the resolution stated efforts would be made by regional authorities to assist 
IDPs, these efforts were very limited and mainly restricted to online information on 
government websites (Ferris, Mamutov, Moroz, and Vynogradova 2015, 14). The 
website called the Informational Resource for Citizens, provides information to displaced 
people about jobs, schools, and places to stay. However, this site was rarely updated, and 
the information it contained was no longer relevant (Ferris, Mamutov, Moroz, and 
Vynogradova 2015, 14). 
The Ministry of Social Policy’s (MSP) website created a section titled 
“Information for displaced persons.” This site was meant to provide instructions for 
displaced people on what kind of support they could receive from the state and what 
documents were necessary to be given this government support. This website also 
provided the number for the Ukrainian Government Hotline whose function was to 
“address issues related to temporary stay.” However, it was ineffective because it 
provided no support and often gave telephone numbers for local volunteer groups to 
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people who called (Ministry of Social Policy 2014). This was experienced firsthand by an 
internally displaced person, Svetlana, who fled from her home in Kramatorsk to the 
western city of Lviv. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, she stated, “I called the 
presidential hotline and they gave me a phone number of a volunteer in Lviv” 
(Williamson 2014, 2).  
Shortly after Resolution 298-p took effect, the conflict in the East began and 
added to the growing number people displaced from the annexation of Crimea. In 
response to the conflict, the Ukrainian government passed law 1207 on April 15, 2014 
titled “Law on the rights and freedoms of citizens and legal regime on the temporary 
occupied territory.” This law did little good because it did not recognize people from the 
East, and only indirectly addressed citizens from Crimea as people from the “temporarily 
occupied territory.” This language is important because by not recognizing Crimeans as 
displaced, the government is not responsible for providing protection and assistance 
according to international law. Further, if the law did not establish those fleeing from the 
East as displaced, the government was not required to provide them with aid.  This law 
focused on the illegality of another country invading Ukraine’s borders and formally 
established that Ukraine does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. Therefore, this law 
did nothing to help the in increasing numbers of displaced people. 
As more displaced people came into mainland Ukraine from Crimea and the 
Eastern regions, the pressure increased on the government to provide actual aid for IDPs. 
In an attempt to meet the demands of humanitarian organizations and IDPs, the Cabinet 
of Ministers issued another resolution to address social security issues of the displaced 
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people. Resolution 588-p absolved Resolution 298-p and added measures to provide for 
people “temporarily moved” from the occupied territories of both Crimea and the Eastern 
regions. This resolution differs from the former in its inclusion of people from the 
Eastern regions in Ukraine and its creation of a Coordination Center. Through the 
Coordination Center, displaced people could find information on open housing, find legal 
aid, medical care, and ask questions of the staff for any other concerns related to their 
displacement.  
Though the establishment of the Coordination Center was meant to create one 
outlet where a network of inter-agencies could relay information to the displaced, the 
government did not make the Center well known, and its information was inadequate.   
Humanitarian organizations were unaware of its existence and were surprised to find that 
it was operating. When these organizations attempted to contact the center, they were not 
warmly received. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, members from the 
humanitarian group “Action” discussed their experiences with the center. The first 
member to contact the Center was told he should only call if there was an emergency. 
The second time this man called, he asked if there was a list with vacant houses available 
to the public, and the representative of the Center who spoke with him replied that there 
was not. The third time a member of “Action” called, they asked what the center did for 
displaced people, and the Center answered that when people call for help, they give them 
the telephone numbers of volunteer organizations (Williamson 2014, 6). 
These resolutions, websites, and law 1207 are examples of the government’s 
attempts and failure to amend the crisis in its early stages. These attempts fall short 
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because of the government’s unwillingness to notice the severity of the situation. This is 
understood by noting the language employed in these resolutions and laws. At this time, 
all legislation referred to displaced people as “temporarily removed.” This meant the 
government did not fully recognize people as displaced and therefore did not 
acknowledge the existence of a crisis. By not recognizing these people as displaced, the 
Ukrainian government downplayed the severity of the crisis without tarnishing its 
previous human rights records (Supinsky 2015). This hoax of stability was pertinent to a 
government focused on stabilizing the economy through trade deals with foreign 
countries. Consequently, the legitimacy of the government was undermined in the eyes of 
the people. 
In light of the failure of these resolutions, humanitarian organizations pressured 
the Ukrainian government to create a law that would directly address the issue of 
internally displaced people. During the summer of 2014, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
State Migration Service, and other NGOs aiding the internally displaced in Ukraine 
worked with parliament to create a law that protected the rights of IDPs. After President 
Poroshenko vetoed three bills due to what he perceived to be ineffectiveness at 
confronting IDP problems and pressure from humanitarian organizations to stay true to 
what had been discussed in the previously stated meetings, draft law number 4490 a-1 
was presented before Parliament on August 28, 2014. However, by the time of 
presentation, there were already more than 190,000 people displaced within the country 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014, 6). While the Verkhovna Rada 
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approved the original bill “On the legal status of persons who were forced to leave their 
place of residence as a result of the temporary occupation the Crimea and Sevastapool, or 
circumstances related to the ATO on the territory of Ukraine,” President Poroshenko 
believed the law was too declarative and did not comply with the constitution principles 
of guaranteeing the rights of citizens (Hops 2014). This deadlock between the legislative 
and executive branches of government highlight the inability of Ukraine to be effective in 
passing any legislation that would promptly aid the displaced people. 
After the presentation of this IDP draft law, the Ukrainian government tabled it 
for two months due to Parliament postponing preliminary hearings (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2014, 20). These postponements were due to other issues 
such as the creation of an anticorruption bureau and further anticorruption legislation 
(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2014, 2). This 
further undermines the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and reinforces that the 
government was more focused on trade deals and ending the conflict in the East than 
dealing with the issue at hand.  Nevertheless, on October 1, 2014, the Cabinet of 
Ministers issued Resolution 509.  This Resolution officially recognized the IDP issue and 
gave the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP) permission to start the registration process for 
the internally displaced. One of the main goals of this Resolution was to “take steps to 
establish and maintain a unified database of registered internally displaced persons from 
the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and anti-terrorist operation area” (Cabinet 
of Ministers 509, 2014).  It outlined a procedure to issue certificates of registration for 
internally displaced people. In order to register, the displaced were required to complete a 
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personal information form and list their reason for fleeing their previous area of 
residence. Upon completion of this form, the displaced person was required to submit his 
passport or ID card to prove citizenship or legal residence in Ukraine. 
From its conception, Resolution 509 was doomed to fail. The MSP did not have 
the capacity to process all of the applications it received. Also, confusion existed over the 
requirements for registration, which areas were considered to be under government 
control, and regarding the definition of an IDP. Under Resolution 509, people are allowed 
to apply for government benefits only if they have proper identification as a “Citizen of 
Ukraine” or documentation of status as “a foreigner or stateless person.” This is difficult 
for people who were forced to flee their homes in haste, forgetting to bring documents 
such as birth certificates and marriage licenses. Another issue persisted in those who 
preemptively fled to the West in fear of what could happen to them in the future. These 
people lived in regions that experienced the repercussions of the conflict because they 
bordered the separatist-controlled areas but were considered to be under government 
control.  When these people attempted to apply as displaced, they were viewed as 
ineligible because their region was still considered to be under government control. The 
dispute over which regions are controlled by rebels and which are controlled by the 
government is a problem that plagues the Ukrainian IDP crisis to present today.  
In response to the arduous registration process in resolution 509, on October 17, 
2014 the Ministry of Internal Affairs enacted an order that required only a Ukrainian 
passport or documentation of permanent registration be presented for issuance of IDP 
registration card.  Although this order came into effect, the Migration Services still 
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requested multiple forms of identification and refused to issue documents to displaced 
people because they lacked a functioning system to accurately record the overwhelming 
number of those who wished to register (Coynash, 2014). This caused problems when 
citizens came to renew their IDP registration card. Many were turned away because the 
government said they were never actually listed as IDPs.  
 While the Ministry of Social Policy created an IDP registration system following 
Resolution 509, there was still no official law set forth by the Ukrainian government to 
protect and ensure the rights of displaced people. This meant the MSP had no national 
policy for dealing with IDPs and the displaced people had no formal claim to certain 
rights being violated during the registration process.  
On October 3, 2014, a group of humanitarian organizations sent a letter to the 
chairman of the Verkhovna Rada concerning why the draft law on IDPs was tabled in 
August. This letter addressed the need for a law for IDPs and requested the law be put to 
vote on October 7, 2014 (Matviychuk, 2014). The Verkhovna Rada answered this plea by 
passing the bill “On the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons” on 
October 20, 2014. This bill officially recognized the problem of internal displacement 
and gave rights to them which were previously unclear. These rights include protection 
from forced return to abandoned residences, rights for employment and pensions, 
ensuring voting rights, financial support of IDPs, and promised cooperation of the 
Ukrainian government with other international organizations to end the IDP crisis in 
Ukraine. 
21 
 
 Although the bill formally addressed the IDP problem within the country, it 
provided little in the form of actual aid for displaced people. By the time the Rada passed 
the bill for IDPs the total number of displaced people had already surpassed 190,000 and 
continued to increase. Also, the bill also failed to establish a way to enforce the 
protection of displaced people’s rights as citizens because it did not establish clear 
avenues for how to enforce the law. Further, the bill was adopted, but it could not be 
enacted because it lacked the signature of president. Poroshenko signed the bill into law 
on November 19, 2014, almost a month after the bill was adopted. 
After the law was enacted, it created much confusion regarding the definition of 
an IDP because it conflicted with the definition set forth by Resolution 509. According to 
Resolution 509, IDPs are defined as “citizens of Ukraine, foreigners and stateless persons 
permanently residing on the territory of Ukraine, internally displaced persons from the 
temporarily occupied territory and anti-terrorist operation area” (Cabinet of Ministers 
509, 2014). The Ukrainian law defines an internally displaced person as “a citizen of 
Ukraine, permanently residing in Ukraine, who was forced or who left his own residence 
as a result of or in order to avoid the negative effects of armed conflict, the temporary 
occupation, widespread violence, massive human rights violations and natural or 
manmade emergencies” (Cabinet of Ministers 509, 2014).  The confusion lies in the 
law’s failure to include foreign or stateless persons as IDPs. This resulted in the 
revocation of promised benefits such as social protection, reinstatement of social benefits, 
financial support, and information on local governing bodies offered to them under 
Resolution 509. The law and Resolutions work against each other in creating a system 
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capable of dealing with the IDP problem. The Resolution attempted to create a 
registration system, but because it is not a law, the Ministry is able to apply only the parts 
they deem fit. The Law on IDPs makes it illegal to discriminate against displaced people, 
but it does not create a system to ensure the IDPs receive the assistance granted to them 
in the law.  
It is important to note that not everyone in the disputed territories supports the 
separatists. This is important to consider when discussing the Ukrainian government’s 
decision to discontinue social services in the separatist-controlled areas, which forced 
more people to flee and directly led to a rise in the number of IDPs. On November 7, 
2014, the Ukrainian government announced the terms of Resolution 595. According to 
this resolution, beginning December 1, the Ukrainian government would no longer pay 
social benefits or pensions in areas not under government control.  If citizens in 
separatist-controlled areas did not flee by this time, they would be cut off from 
government financial support. This meant citizens had less than one month to move from 
their homes and attempt to register as displaced people, and forced the already 
overwhelmed registration system to take on more applications. The government enacted 
the resolution in order to secure the borders under its control and decrease extra expenses 
to areas that were no longer considered part of Ukraine.  
The Resolution was also a tool employed by the Ukrainian government to force 
governmental dependence on the Eastern regions. The hope was that by ceasing to 
provide benefits for those in the East, the separatists would realize the need for the 
Ukrainian government. This realization would then facilitate negotiations between 
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leaders, or force the separatists to admit failure. As a result of the negotiations or 
concession of failure, the government would regain control of the Eastern regions held by 
the separatists. Regaining control of the non-government controlled areas was the 
government’s main plan for dealing with the IDP problem. In a press conference with 
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, he stated the “ultimate goal” for Ukraine was 
“establishing conditions for these [displaced] people to return back home” (Department 
of Information and Communication of the Secretariat of the CMU 2014). This press 
conference is evidence of how the government started to acknowledge the problem of 
displaced people; however, did not have a concrete plan to handle them. It simply said 
they needed to make improvements to the registration system but emphasized returning 
displaced people to their previous areas of residence. In the press conference, Prime 
Minister Yatsenyuk also addressed issues with Resolution 595. He acknowledged the 
potential issue of a humanitarian rights catastrophe with cutting off non-government 
controlled areas in the East, and assured that gas and electricity would still be provided. 
He went on to state, “But the amount of funds reserved by the Government for the 
payment of pensions, benefits, subsidies… will be reduced by the cost of gas and 
electricity. It seems that is fair.” (Department of Information and Communication of the 
Secretariat of the CMU 2014).  
The government’s plan had the opposite effect on citizens residing in these areas. 
Ukrainian citizens in these regions felt the government was abandoning part of Ukraine 
and voiced their opinions with remarks such as “Up at the top they gave away Crimea, 
and now Donbas” and “Isn’t Donetsk part of Ukraine?” (Coynash 2014). The financial 
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support from the government was a lifeline for elderly people in these regions, and upon 
its revocation, these people were forced to turn to other avenues for aid, further 
delegitimizing the government in the eyes of the people (Coynash, 2014).  
For those who were forced to leave their homes in order to receive government 
benefits, everything was left behind. There was no guarantee for where these people 
would live, work, or what they would eat. The government only said people needed to 
flee and register as displaced people, but did not provide a system to provide these basic 
needs. This is merely another example of how the Ukrainian government contributed to 
the IDP problem. At the time this resolution went into affect, there were 460,365 
displaced people (United Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2014, 1). 
By January 30, 2015, roughly two months after this resolution went into effect, the 
number of displaced people more than tripled with 943,500 people registered as displaced 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015, 7). 
Though appalling, this number does not include all who are displaced; it counts 
only the number of people who have been able to complete the formal registration 
process. There are more people attempting to register but encountering many government 
obstacles. For example, children born in separatist-controlled areas are not considered 
Ukrainian citizens, and one cannot register as displaced if they are not a citizen of 
Ukraine (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015, 4). Obtaining a birth 
certificate issued by the Ukrainian Government is difficult because birth certificates 
issued in non-government controlled areas have the stamp of the de facto authorities, and 
the government refuses to recognize this documentation as legitimate (United Nations 
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High Commissioner for Refugees 2015, 3). This has created large problems for families 
who were not able to flee before their child was born. The parents possess the right to 
register as a displaced person, but they cannot register their child until they conquer the 
barrier of citizenship. While this does not directly add to the number of people displaced, 
it is an example how the government continues to contribute to the IDP problem and how 
the government is delegitimizing itself through its actions. Further examples of the 
Ukrainian government contributing to the IDP crisis continue to arise, such as the court 
battle that occurred after the enactment of Resolution 595. 
 The Resolution was considered unlawful by the negatively affected citizens, and it 
was taken to court for review. On February 2, 2015, the District Administrative Court of 
Kiev attempted to terminate Resolution 595 and required the Ukrainian government to 
resume payments to the non-government controlled areas (KyivPost 2015). However, 
instead of cooperating with the decision of the district court, the government refused to 
pay any moneys to citizens of Eastern Ukraine and decided to try the case in Appeal 
Administrative Court. This court also ruled in favor of the citizens, yet the government 
continued to appeal the ruling. According to the rebel-controlled Donetsk News Agency, 
on October 16, 2015, lawyer Irina Khiznyak, reported the decision of the courts to 
overturn Resolution 595 (Donetsk News Agency, 2015). With these rulings, the 
government had to resume paying social benefits in January 2016. This victory is 
overshadowed by the complications people of Eastern Ukraine still experience with the 
permit system set forth by the Ukrainian government in January 2015.  
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On January 21, 2015, the Ukrainian government announced a temporary order 
that created a border between the government controlled areas and non- government 
controlled areas and required a system of permits to cross it. This border line is similar to 
the one the government set forth in Resolution 595, and although that resolution was 
overturned, this order remains in effect. When it was brought to Kiev Circuit 
Administrative Court, it was rejected on grounds that the Order was adopted illegally. 
This order contributes to the IDP problem because it separates the people in the East from 
the rest of population of Ukraine. Further, this not only adds to the already arduous task 
of registering as a displaced person, it creates problems for people who live in the conflict 
zones but buy their food and medicines across this make shift border. A person is no 
longer allowed to cross the border without obtaining a permit to do so. However, the 
process to obtain the necessary permit is as arduous as the process to register oneself as a 
displaced person. Upset by the order, different human rights organizations pushed the 
government to veto the order or make amendments on the grounds of human rights 
violations (Marples, 2015). In June of 2015, amendments were made to the order, but 
there were parts introduced in the document that were not discussed previously with other 
groups. These three parts included: using tickets between checkpoints, transportation 
issues of goods by railway, and the prohibition of public transportation across the border 
(Marples, 2015).  
 As of October 2015, no national policy existed on how to meet the needs of the 
displaced people in Ukraine.  One year after the law declaring the rights and freedoms of 
IDPs was enacted, the only change seen was an increase in the number of displaced 
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people. The Verkhovna Rada seemed content to put forth legislation without providing 
the necessary mechanisms to implement the promised social programs. The number of 
people displaced by fall of 2015 reached 1.4 million people (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Center 2015, 1.) More are still displaced but hindered from registering due to 
ineligibility. Others have not registered due to fear of military conscription. Still more 
have not registered due to fear that registering will be viewed as an allegiance to the 
Ukrainian government and negatively affect family members remaining in the East 
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2015, 11). Some citizens decide 
not to flee because they have jobs in these regions that are their only source of income 
and have realized that there will be no government assistance if they flee.  Further, as the 
conflict continues to grow, control of different areas changes frequently. As control 
changes, areas where citizens are considered displaced also changes. Therefore, citizens 
might be considered displaced one month but not the next because the area is no longer 
considered separatist-controlled (Moldovan, 2015). The IDPs do not want to engage in 
the arduous registration process only to be told they no longer qualify. 
 The government’s refusal to pay pensions and salaries, the difficult registration 
process, and the confusing definition of who constitutes as an IDP has contributed to the 
rise in number of IDPs within Ukraine. Now two years from the start of the conflict, the 
total number of IDPs continues to increase with no apparent end in sight. The Ukrainian 
government is too consumed with ending the conflict in the East to acknowledge the 
needs of the IDPs within Ukraine. If this persists, it is likely that Ukrainians who have 
been subjected to the conflict will turn away from the Ukrainian government completely 
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and look to other countries or humanitarian organizations for help. There is probable 
cause to assume the government will never have complete control over these regions 
again if they do not provide significant aid IDP problem. People who were once 
supported the government and the idea of a united Ukraine now feel that they have been 
betrayed by the government. It is in the best interest of the government to attend to the 
IDP crisis because the negative sentiments felt toward the government can be a 
dangerous if used by separatists to garner support. 
 
Recent Attempts and Looking Forward: 
 In order to combat the negative affects of prior legislation, humanitarian 
organizations and the office of the ombudsmen worked together to create draft law 2166. 
This law would change the 6-month limit on registration forms to an indefinite amount of 
time. It also addresses the issue of defining an IDP by including the phrase “foreign or 
stateless person who is in Ukraine on legal grounds and is entitled to permanent residence 
in Ukraine.” Another major problem with the original law concerns the documents 
required for registration. The draft law, if passed, would rectify this by allowing people to 
prove their identity with documentation such as military cards, home videos, education 
certificates, or employment records. By including foreigners and stateless people in the 
definition of an IDP and allowing more opportunities to identify oneself, more displaced 
people can receive benefits from the government. 
 On May 19, 2015 the draft law passed the first reading of the Verkhovna Rada 
(Council of Europe 2015). It was not adopted by parliament until November 3, 2015, but 
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it was then vetoed by President Poroshenko. He added a series of proposals that 
addressed the amount of authority officials possessed in looking for information on past 
places of residence of displaced people. Parliament then amended the law with the 
President’s suggestions and the Verkhovna Rada adopted the draft law on December 24, 
2015. The President signed the law into action on January 7, 2016 
 The creation of this law suggests that the Ukrainian Government is finally taking 
steps toward addressing the IDP problem. This is seen by creating registration forms with 
indefinite time limits and addressing problems not discussed in former legislation such as 
orphans and children who arrive with legal guardians. Humanitarian organizations hope 
to see a decline in the number of IDPs and a rise in the satisfaction levels of the displaced 
people with the government as a result of this law. Only time can tell if this law will help 
to end the IDP crisis or fall short as the other attempts by the Ukrainian Government 
have. If the government is successful in bringing an end to the IDP crisis or simply 
providing mechanisms to better aid the displaced, a sense of legitimacy can be restored 
for the Ukrainian government in the eyes of the people. As of now, there are over 1.5 
million people registered as displaced in Ukraine (Hetfield 2016). With this number 
experiencing no decrease, and the inability of the government to handle the IDP problem 
thus far, displaced people are becoming more reliant on local and foreign aid for help 
instead of the government. Unless the Ukrainian government can find a way to combat 
this growing dependency on foreign aid, the legitimacy of the government will continue 
to be undermined with no one to blame but itself.  
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Chapter 3: Decline in Public Support Further Undermines the Legitimacy of the 
Government 
 
This chapter will explore how the Ukrainian government’s actions concerning the 
IDP problem has only generated a loss of faith among citizens further undermining the 
legitimacy of the government. Through interviews, one will see this loss of faith is 
evident with IDPs who receive little to no help from the government, are not able to cross 
the bureaucratic barriers of the registration system, or are not receiving promised benefits 
guaranteed by law. These interviews display the change in mindset among Ukrainian 
IDPs from reliance on the government to reliance humanitarian organizations. Increased 
reliance on humanitarian organizations is problematic because they are understaffed and 
underfunded. They need help from the government which too is problematic because the 
government itself is underfunded and focuses its attention on ending the conflict rather 
than helping displaced people.  
Beginnings of the Decline: 
Initially, when the problem of internal displacement erupted in early March 2014, 
people looked to the government for economic and social aid in the form of legislation 
that would allow them to find new places to live. The ratification of the law concerning 
IDPs in October 2014 was met with gratification from international human right 
organizations (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014, 1). They hoped 
that the Ukrainian government, after months of vetoing and postponing parliamentary 
hearings of draft laws, was finally recognizing the need to help IDPs. However, shortly 
after, IDPs began experiencing the difficulties brought on by vague language of laws and 
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an unclear definition of who was considered to be an IDP. The registration process it 
implemented was disorganized and underfunded (Supinsky 2015). Also, systems put into 
place by the government proved inadequate at providing substantial monetary 
supplements to IDPs.  An example of this inadequacy is seen in the the government’s 
benefit system. This system entitled displaced people the equivalent of twenty dollars per 
month for their first two months of displacement; however, after those two months, they 
were only entitled to the equivalent of ten dollars per month (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 
2015, 1). This unsubstantial amount has only further fostered the belief that the 
government lacks the capacity to provide for its people. 
David Stern, a reporter for BBC news, conducted an interview with a family who 
fled from the Eastern city of Kramatorsk. In this interview, the mother, Irina Kipina, 
recounted her personal experience of fleeing her home and the events she had 
experienced since arriving in the small village of Vorzel, a suburb of Kiev. She informed 
Stern that since arriving in Vorzel, her family had only received government help in the 
form of twenty dollars. As a result, Irina stopped relying on the government and now 
looks to the local volunteer group “Kozhen Mozhe” for answers to questions of housing, 
clothing, and healthcare. In her interview with BBC news she stated, “Unfortunately, 
everyone knows we can’t expect any kind of help from the government…Everything has 
been placed on the volunteers’ shoulders” (Stern 2015). Irina’s story provides a perfect 
example of families realizing the inability of the Ukrainian government to meet basic 
needs of IPS and turning to humanitarian organizations for help.  
Looking to Humanitarian Organizations for Help  
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Stories similar to Irina’s are common among displaced people in Ukraine. A 
spokesperson for the Ukrainian ombudsman’s office stated “While the government has 
taken some measures… the vast majority of displaced people are left to fend for 
themselves.” This statement is a testament to the inefficiency of the government in 
creating productive avenues to assist displaced people. These inefficiencies force 
displaced people to look to humanitarian organizations for help and create a burden on 
already overworked organizations. Evidence for this is provided by the documentary film 
titled Ukraine. Displaced: Post-trauma, produced by the Ukrainian internet television 
channel Hromadske.tv. This documentary shows a humanitarian organization in Kharkov 
helping IDPs arriving on trains from the East. This organization, known as Station 
Kharkov, helps provide food, clothing, and free train tickets to other cities in Ukraine. 
When asked what they do at the train station, the leader of the organization replied, “We 
help IDPs!” (Hromads’ke Telebachennia 2015a). All assistance administered by Station 
Kharkov is provided by volunteers, and no financial support comes from the government. 
When displaced people arrive at the station seeking answers to questions, the volunteers 
help them by providing current information as well as help with the registration process. 
Government programs have promised to provide these same benefits but have completely 
failed to do so. Thus, reliance has shifted to local organizations that are able to provide 
IDPs with results. 
 Another example of the shift in reliance persists in the story of a family from a 
small Eastern Ukrainian village. Nina and her five children were forced to move when 
artillery shattered her roof. Instead of turning to the government for help, she sought out 
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the village council who helped her find a new home. Lack of government support and the 
arduous process of crossing the newly enforced borders have forced Nina and her family 
to remain in a war zone. In her interview, she stated “when there is shelling…. We all sit 
here together, fighting off fear” (Levin 2015). 
This shift is further highlighted in an interview by Hromadske.tv with a displaced 
person from Debaltseve named Marina. In this interview, Marina discusses her life since 
she arrived in the city of Kharkov. Marina has two children, one of which is sick with 
pneumonia from walking to safety in the snow without proper shoes. She does not have 
money or a plan for the future, but she is grateful for the shelter she has now.  In her 
interview she stated, “The state is not taking care of us, so at least we are getting help 
from private individuals” (Hromads’ke Telebachennia 2015a). 
Without the support of humanitarian organizations, the Ukrainian government 
would be facing an IDP problem of even greater magnitude. Evidence for this opinion 
occurs in the city of Sergeev where a home for disabled IDPs was created by local 
humanitarian organizations. In this village of 5,000 people, 1,000 of the people are 
disabled IDPs.  The displaced people in Sergeev asked questions about money from the 
government and why this money has not arrived. The humanitarian leader’s response to 
this inquiry was. “Kiev is delaying the money. I don’t know about the reason of this 
delay, but they promise the money will be here any minute” (Hromads’ke Telebachennia 
2015b). Without the money from the government, organization leaders worry about how 
they will continue to run this safe haven for IDPs. When discussing these fears, one of the 
leaders stated “As of now, we have not received one kopek from the state” (Hromads’ke 
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Telebachennia 2015b). They owe over 1,100,000 UAH (over 41,000 dollars) in 
electricity bills and even more in water and taxes. The same leader stated, “If the 
authorities do not react, I don’t know where we will find the money to pay for this.”  This 
dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian government helps to explain the shift towards 
humanitarian organizations and further undermines the legitimacy of the government to 
aid in this problem. 
This attitude about the government exists in the majority of the displaced. When 
interviewed, an IDP named Svetlana Kovalenk stated, “I love my country. I’m proud to 
be Ukrainian, but our government has done nothing for us.  Everything you see is what 
we have… we depend on volunteers” (Salem 2015). Others, like Olga Ausudiskutsa and 
her family are not as diplomatic in statements concerning the government. When 
interviewed, Olga stated, “Nobody came to tell us about the humanitarian corridor… The 
government has just forgotten us.” (Salem 2015). In a series of interviews produced by 
Eurasianet last spring, displaced people from the city of Slovyansk expressed their 
frustration with the central government. One woman stated, “Our local government tells 
us that no one pays anything out of the budget from Kyiv. That is, Kyiv really does not 
give a damn about us” (Mielnikiewicz 2015).  
People are upset with the government for leaving them in what some refer to as “a 
bureaucratic maze,” and feel as if they have been cast aside. Upon arriving in 
Dnipropetrovsk, a former Donetsk resident told interviewers “We feel abandoned… 
When they are shelling around you, you feel nobody needs you” (Quintanilla, Parafeniuk, 
and Moroz 2015, 9). Even people who have managed to find sufficient housing without 
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assistance from the government are frustrated. This is evident in the story of Yana 
Matveyeva. 
Yana Matveyeva is a 37-year-old woman who fled from her hometown of Donetsk 
when pro-Russian sentiment began spreading throughout the city. She feared persecution 
for being pro-Ukrainian and supporting the events that occurred at Euromaidan. Thanks 
to her husband’s job as a businessman, they were able to rent an apartment without 
assistance from the government. When asked about leaving Donetsk Yana stated that 
they left “at the end of May 2014 planning to be gone no longer than a month” (Personal 
Correspondence with Yana Matveyeva 2015). When asked about her opinions concerning 
the performance of the Poroshenko Presidency, she replied “I cannot say I am satisfied 
with how he acted and reacted during the last two years. There were many promises that 
have not been kept. Many reforms that never took place” (Personal Correspondence 
2015). Yana is an example of an IDP frustrated with the government’s lack of providing 
for displaced people, but she has the ability to support herself without government 
assistance. This is not true for most of the displaced in Ukraine.  
 In other regions of the East, people express their anger with the Ukrainian 
government in stronger statements. Pastor Sergei Kosyak stated, “People will survive, but 
they will never forget the devastating hardship inflicted on them by our leaders. Those 
who were against Ukraine will become fixed in their views. Those who were for it will 
never wish to live in such a Ukraine” (Marples 2015). His opinion is that more people 
will be pushed towards Russia as a result of the government’s actions. A resident of 
Donetsk also criticizes the government’s actions over social media saying their refusal to 
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accept all Ukrainian citizens is “the government’s acceptance of the DPR…” (Coynash 
2014). This citizen continues to write that the people actually assisting displaced people 
are volunteers and other Ukrainian citizens not directly affected by the conflict.  
 
Humanitarian Organizations taking Control: 
 As the conflict continues, the Ukrainian government is content to allow volunteer 
organizations to handle the IDP problem. This is evident by the increased amount of 
humanitarian aid distributed to Ukrainians since the onset of conflict as well as through 
interviews of humanitarian workers within Ukraine.  
As previously stated, as the Ukrainian Government passed legislation to help solve 
the IDP problem, the numbers of displaced people continued to increase. This is true for 
the distribution of humanitarian aid as well. When the first IDPs arrived from Crimea in 
March 2014, the amount of humanitarian aid distributed was 3.5 million dollars 
(Swithern 2015, 96). When the law for IDPs took effect in October of 2014, the amount 
of humanitarian aid had risen to 46.1 million dollars. This number increased to 64.6 
million dollars by December of 2014 (Swithern 2015, 96). As government programs fail 
to provide aid for IDPs, humanitarian aid has been forced to increase. 
 The increase in humanitarian aid is not going unnoticed by humanitarian aid 
workers. In interviews, workers express their frustration at the realization that the 
government has only increased their burden. Oleksandra Dvoretska, the coordinator for 
the human rights initiative Vostok-SOS, stated in an interview “…the state does five 
percent of the work, while volunteers do the remaining ninety-five” (Lelich 2015, 85). 
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Oleksandra is not the only humanitarian worker who is tired of the government deferring 
the responsibility of displaced people to humanitarian organizations. In an interview with 
Internews, an aid worker in Zaporizhzya stated, “The government is absent. They don’t 
realize that IDPs are everybody’s problem, for the whole Ukraine” (Quintanilla, 
Parafeniuk, and Moroz 2015, 9).  These workers are frustrated with the Ukrainian 
government for not dealing with the IDP crisis and for the poor programs they put in 
place when pushed for action. One international aid worker told interviewers, “The 
Ukrainian government is not helping the IDP situation with contradictory policies that 
create negative consequences and a very large number of protection issues” (Quintanilla, 
Parafeniuk, and Moroz 2015, 10). The inefficiency of these government programs can be 
seen in the contact lists the government provided to humanitarian organizations of places 
willing to host IDPs. Oleksandra Dvoretska told interviewers about a time when she 
called almost 400 places on the list provided to her by the government. “It turned out that 
only one option was viable” said Dvoretska (Lelich 2015, 86). 
It is important for the Ukrainian government to begin implementing better programs 
for displaced people or to provide financial relief for the organizations that are presently 
responding to the internal displacement problem. Currently, volunteer humanitarian 
organizations such as the UNHCR and Caritas Internationalis, are underfunded. The 
regional director for the charity CRS stated, “We could do more for the people in Ukraine 
if we had more resources” (Caritas Czech Republic 2015). These organizations are not 
able to reach all displaced people, nor are they able to provide accommodation for the all 
of the IDPs with whom they come in contact.  In July of 2014, the UNHCR stated that 
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over 111,000 people were registered as displaced in Ukraine. Out of this number, they 
were only able to assist 80,000 people (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
2014, 6). In January of 2015, the number of people displaced was over 940,000 with an 
expected increase to 1,400,000 people by December. Out of this, the UNHCR could only 
afford to assist 900,000 people by December 2015 (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees 2015, 7).  
Furthering this problem, the increase in the number of IDPs in Ukraine exceeded 
the expectations of the UNHCR and reached 1.4 million by August (IMDC). This means 
that even more IDPs than originally thought went without assistance in the year of 2015. 
Where humanitarian organizations like the UNHCR cannot help, the Ukrainian Civil 
Society has inserted itself. Many cities have welcomed IDPs and provided assistance in 
the forms of shelter and food; however, this sense of duty to help is beginning to wane. 
Everyday Ukrainian citizens are growing tired of the economic pressure the IDPs put on 
their cities (Curtis 2015). With no definitive end in sight to the conflict in the East, people 
are beginning lose interest in helping IDPs. In her interview, Oleksandra Dvoretska 
emphasized this point. She commented on how “You can feel exhaustion even among 
those who are willing to help…The situation has changed. Not every family is ready to 
house strangers for years” (Lelich 2015, 86-87). 
To combat the exhaustion of civil society, the government must to take more 
responsibility for internally displaced people. When the government is accused of not 
adequately handling the IDP problem, its states that there are simply too many people 
that are in need of assistance. The government argues that it has set up coordination 
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centers, but it is the responsibility of the local governments to make these places more 
accessible (Mielnikiewicz 2015). The government paints itself in a positive light, always 
stating that it is doing the best it can. Even if this is true, people no longer expect help 
from the government. They firmly believe the only help they will receive is from 
humanitarian organizations. This move away from governmental expectations shows how 
unsuccessful the government has been in pacifying the IDP problem.  
The increases in humanitarian aid distribution and dependence on humanitarian 
organizations occurred simultaneously with the enforcement of legislation for rights of 
IDPs. Since there is no decrease in the dependence on humanitarian organizations, one 
can assume that the government’s attempts have been less than successful. Unless the 
IDP problem becomes more important to the leaders of Ukraine, the dependence on 
humanitarian will continue to increase and reliance on the government will continue to 
decrease. If this reliance decreases, there could be major repercussions for the Ukrainian 
government. People will not easily forget the incapacity of the government to aid the 
people who supported it. The idea of a unified Ukraine will never exist if people do not 
trust the government. Finally, militant groups can capitalize on this dissent when 
attempting to garner the support of Ukrainians. 
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Conclusion 
 
          From the preceding chapters is it clear that the Ukrainian government has not 
been successful in handling the IDP problem. Through poor legislation, inefficient 
programs, lack of funding to humanitarian organization, and a preoccupation with ending 
the conflict in the East, the number of displaced people in Ukraine has only increased.  
As this number increases, the Ukrainian government continues to pass new legislation 
that promises to aid the problem of displacement; however, no current legislation has 
accomplished this goal. Even so, this is a contemporary issue and each day brings new 
information regarding IDPs in Ukraine. 
         It is also incorrect to fault the Ukrainian government for the deterioration in the 
IDP situation because it is not completely in their control. This is evident in the focus on 
ending the crisis in the East. As stated, ending the conflict in the East is at the forefront of 
the Ukrainian government’s agenda. The government believes that if it could end the 
conflict the displaced people could return to their homes. Although there have been 
attempts to have peace talks with separatist leaders of Donetsk and Lugansk, there have 
been few improvements in the conflict. This is due to the involvement of other countries 
with the conflict. Ukraine wants to see an end to the conflict, but it must get the 
autonomous regions and Russia to agree to negotiations. This can be seen in the 
discussions at Minsk in September of 2014 and February of 2015. 
         These talks included leaders from France, Germany, and Belarus and focused on 
the best way to end the conflict. Under the Minsk Protocol, twelve points were laid out to 
bring about peace in the warring regions. These points were agreed to by both President 
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Putin and President Poroshenko. The main points of this protocol were: ensuring the 
removal of weapons from both sides, the release of hostages, creation of a law granting 
special status for the Eastern regions, and taking steps to improve the humanitarian 
situation in the Donbas region. However, there was no mention of what to do with people 
displaced from these regions. The twelve points listed at this meeting were not upheld, 
and the number of displaced people continued to increase. 
         The Minks II agreements took place on February 11, 2015 in response to the 
failure of the former Minsk Protocol. During these talks, displaced people were once 
again denied a voice. The main points of these agreements were similar to the those of 
the earlier document with the addition of the decentralization of rebel regions and 
Ukrainian control of the border by the end of 2015 (Weaver and Luhn 2015). After the 
ceasefire went into affect on February 15, residents of the Eastern city Donetsk said they 
noticed that the truce was holding because the shooting ceased and it was quiet (Ukraine 
Today 2015).  
  This ceasefire brought about periods of quiet in the East and helped the Ukrainian 
government take over some of the once separatist-controlled territory. Due to this, some 
IDPs have been encouraged to return home, but upon arrival receive no help from the 
government and find their former cities in ruins. Also, after returning to a former place of 
residency, under the IDP law, the returner is no longer considered an IDP after a short 
period of time. Both Minsk agreements highlight a problem faced by the Ukrainian 
government in that it lacks the ability to resolve the IDP problem on its own. As long as 
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the conflict persist in the East, the Ukrainian government will be preoccupied with 
resolving it.   
         Therefore, successfully ending the IDP problem in Ukraine relies on ending the 
conflict in the East. This is a major component because it takes away foreign involvement 
in national affairs, and people can return to their previous areas of residence. This would 
alleviate many of the problems the government is experiencing now as a result of IDPs. 
For example, the cities experiencing overcrowding and economic issues will start to feel 
relief as people return home.  Also, the government and humanitarian organization will 
experience relief from providing housing for the more than one million IDPs.  
         The end of the conflict in the East will bring on new problems for the Ukrainian 
government. The need to rebuild infrastructure in the cities will cost money that the 
government does not have. Also, programs will need to be created to help support people 
attempting to rebuild their lives in these war-torn cities. As of now, the government's 
track record for implementing programs has been less than successful, and people feel 
that the government in incapable of providing assistance. The government will have to 
provide heavily for these people if it wishes to overcome the stigma it has given itself. 
         For now, the conflict in Ukraine seems to continue with no end in sight. As a 
result, the Ukrainian government needs to find a way to better implement its programs 
and help those displaced by conflict. So far, it has not been able provide substantial 
support to displaced people and as a result delegitimized itself. If the government can 
find a way to make better legislation, follow through on the implementation of social 
programs, and provide support for humanitarian organizations, then we might see another 
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shift in the mindset of Ukrainians to one that views the government in a better light. This 
could help by giving the Ukrainian government the sense of legitimacy it needs for future 
support of programs and legislation. However, until the government provides for those 
displaced, its actions will only continue to undermine its legitimacy in the minds of the 
people.  
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